Stochastic Games for Smart Grid Energy Management with Prospect
  Prosumers by Etesami, Seyed Rasoul et al.
Stochastic Games for Smart Grid Energy Management with
Prospect Prosumers
S. Rasoul Etesami, Walid Saad, Narayan Mandayam, and H. Vincent Poor
Abstract— In this paper, the problem of smart grid energy
management under stochastic dynamics is investigated. In the
considered model, at the demand side, it is assumed that
customers can act as prosumers who own renewable energy
sources and can both produce and consume energy. Due to the
coupling between the prosumers’ decisions and the stochastic
nature of renewable energy, the interaction among prosumers is
formulated as a stochastic game, in which each prosumer seeks
to maximize its payoff, in terms of revenues, by controlling its
energy consumption and demand. In particular, the subjective
behavior of prosumers is explicitly reflected into their payoff
functions using prospect theory, a powerful framework that
allows modeling real-life human choices, rather than objective,
user-agnostic decisions, as normative models do. For this
prospect-based stochastic game, it is shown that there always
exists a stationary Nash equilibrium where the prosumers’
trading policies in the equilibrium are independent of the time
and their histories of the play. Moreover, to obtain one of
such equilibrium policies, a novel distributed algorithm with no
information sharing among prosumers is proposed and shown
to converge to an -Nash equilibrium in which each prosumer
is able to achieve its optimal payoff in an equilibrium up to a
small additive error . On the other hand, at the supply side,
the interaction between the utility company and the prosumers
is formulated as an online optimization problem in which the
utility company’s goal is to learn its optimal energy allocation
rules. For this case, it is shown that such an optimization
problem admits a no-regret algorithm meaning that regardless
of the actual outcome of the game among the prosumers,
the utility company can follow a strategy that mitigates its
allocation costs as if it knew the entire demand market a
priori. Simulation results show the convergence of the proposed
algorithms to their predicted outcomes and present new insights
resulting from prospect theory that contribute toward more
efficient energy management in the smart grids.
I. INTRODUCTION
The electric power grid is evolving into a heterogeneous
smart grid econsystem that will seamlessly integrate renew-
able resources, storage units, electric vehicles, smart meters,
and other intelligent appliances [1]–[3]. One key feature
of the smart grid is the use of storage devices for energy
management among grid components. As shown recently in
[4], [5], incorporating storage devices into the grid design
can significantly improve energy management and result in
huge cost saving in electricity delivery. In fact, the role of
storage devices is even more pronounced when a portion of
injected electricity to the grid is obtained from renewables
(e.g., wind power or solar energy). This is due to the many
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uncertainties, such as weather conditions, that can impact
the amount of generated energy from such resources. In
such situations, having access to storage units to save the
current excess energy and use it whenever there is energy
shortage in the grid will bring a lot of flexibility into
the energy management. Therefore, managing uncertainties
using storage devices and properly controlling the production
and distribution of electricity are some of the most important
challenges in the design and analysis of smart grids.
A. Related Work
There has been significant recent works that investigated
the challenges of grid energy management in the presence
of storage units and renewable energy [6]–[11]. In [6] the
authors studied the problem of energy management using
load shifting thus allowing a part of the peak hour load to
be moved to an off-peak hour. However, their formulation
was based on a static noncooperative game which cannot
capture the stochastic nature of various grid components,
such as renewable energy. Moreover, the work in [6] relies
on the notion of weighting from prospect theory, however,
in practice both weighting and framing effects can impact
consumer behavior (as will be shown in this work). In [7]
an optimization framework was adopted to study the price
fluctuations in electricity market. However, in this work, the
agents were assumed to be either producers or consumers
of energy. The works in [8], [10], and [12] studied grid
energy management using an incentive compatible double-
auction mechanism where the grid users bid for energy
and utility companies set the price. However, these works
focus on mechanism design problems and do not account
for the behavior of consumers. A prediction-based pricing
mechanism for data centers was proposed in [9] while taking
into account renewable energy sources. However, the work
in [9] relies on centralized optimization problem rather than
on a distributed game-theoretic framework. Moreover, the
work in [11] proposed a day-ahead bidding strategy which
allows the supply-side to know in advance an estimate of
the amount of energy to be provided to the demand-side
during the upcoming day. However, the formulation in [11]
is based on a static noncooperative game and it does not take
into account the subjective behavior of the users.
The effects of integrating storage units on the resilience of
smart grids has been investigated in [13]. Moreover, control-
ling the uncertainties of renewable resources using stochastic
optimization methods was studied in [1] and [14]. Since
the solution of such optimization problems is challenging,
there has been an increased interest in the use of other
methods such as online learning or regret minimization with
the aim of handling uncertainties as done in [15] and [16].
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In addition, there has been a number of works that appeared
on the use of game theory for analyzing the interactions
between consumers and power companies [3], [17], and [18]
mainly based on Stackelberg or static game models. More
recently, it has been observed that in practical grids the
subjective view of decision makers about their opponents can
play an important role in changing the final outcomes [19].
This new perspective is often inspired from prospect theory
(PT) [20], a mathematical framework which explains real-life
decision-making and its deviations from conventional game
theory. Indeed, as shown in [6], [21], and [13], explicitly
accounting for the subjective behavior of prosumers using PT
can substantially change the anticipated energy management
outcomes resulting from the participation of prosumers in
energy trading. However, most of these works focus on the
weighting effects of PT, and ignore the framing effects.
Despite being interesting, these existing works have fo-
cused on static game formulations which are not quite
descriptive under practical smart grid settings in which many
factors, such as renewable energy, are highly dynamic and
stochastic. This motivates the use of a richer class of games,
namely stochastic games, in order to capture such dynamic
uncertain environments. Stochastic games have been ex-
tensively studied in the literature [22]–[24], with solutions
crucially based on reinforcement learning [25]; however,
beyond a handful of works [26] that address the security
of power grids against cyber-physical attacks, most of the
existing applications do not address the problem of smart grid
energy management. In particular, in most of the literature on
stochastic games [22], [26], a typical assumption is that each
of the players has full information about the entire underlying
game, which is a questionable assumption in many practical
settings. For instance, in many situations, the prosumers do
not have access to each others’ private information such as
the amount of stored or consumed energy.
B. Contributions
Our work in this paper provides one of the first formu-
lations for smart grid energy management using stochastic
games which works under incomplete information settings.
Furthermore, since many grid components are owned and op-
erated by humans, their subjective perceptions and decisions
can substantially affect the grid outcomes. This makes PT a
natural choice for smart grid design and analysis under real
behavioral considerations on the behavior of smart grid pro-
sumers. In particular, the subjective behavior of prosumers
is even more pronounced when their uncertainty about the
grid (as a result of stochastic renewables) or their opponents’
decisions increases. Therefore, studying real-life decision-
makings in smart grids under highly dynamic settings using
a stochastic game framework has not been addressed before.
The main contribution of this paper is to develop a novel
framework for smart grid energy management which takes
into account the stochastic nature of renewable energy, the
distributed nature of the system, and the subjective percep-
tions of the prosumers. Our work differs from most existing
literature [6]–[11] in several aspects: 1) it models interactions
between selfish prosumers using a stochastic game with
incomplete information, 2) it incorporates real-life decision
behavior of prosumers under the stochastic game framework
(rather than a static game such as in [6]) by using the framing
and weighting effects of PT and studies its deviations from
conventional expected utility theory (EUT), 3) it provides
a novel distributed algorithm to obtain equilibrium points of
the system with incomplete information (unlike conventional
methods such as reinforcement learning [27], [28]), and 4) it
provides a computationally tractable and robust formulation
for the utility company using online convex optimization.
In the studied model, at the demand side, we consider a set
of prosumers which can both produce and consume energy.
At each time instant, each prosumer decides on the amount of
energy to consume and the amount of extra energy demand
to buy from the utility company under a given pricing rule.
The energy demand of each prosumer can depend on the
energy storage level as well as the generated renewable
energy of all other prosumers. In particular, each prosumer
makes a decision based on its own subjective view on the
energy market outcomes in order to maximize its payoff
which reflects its loss or gain, in terms of revenues, in the
grid. We show that such a game admits a stationary Nash
equilibrium (NE) and we propose a distributed algorithm
on how to drive the entire market to an -NE, i.e., to a
point which nearly maximizes all the prosumers’ payoffs.
Given these prosumer decisions, and in order to satisfy their
energy demands, we further consider a utility company which
responds them by allocating energy to different substations,
and whose goal is to predict prosumers’ demands in order
to satisfy their energy needs more reliably while minimizing
its own energy distribution costs. Simulation results illustrate
the convergence of the proposed algorithm and show that
the optimal decisions of prosumers in the case of PT are
considerably different from those resulting from a conven-
tional game. As an example, prosumers who have higher
subjective evaluations tend to consume even more energy in
the lower range of their energy storage, and they become
more conservative as their energy storage levels increase.
Such unusual consumption patterns will potentially require
new benchmarks on how to distribute and manage energy
more efficiently across power grids in which prosumers are
actively participating in energy management.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we introduce our system model formally. In Section III, we
prove the existence of an NE in the stochastic game among
prosumers. We provide a learning algorithm for finding an
-NE policy among prosumers in Section IV. In Section V,
we describe a no-regret algorithm for the utility company.
Simulation results are given in Section VI. We conclude the
paper in Section VII.
Notation: For a real number x, we let [x]+ = max{0, x}.
For a vector v, we let vi be its ith component and v′ be its
transpose. We denote all but the ith component of a vector
v by v−i. We let IA be the indicator function of a set A.
Finally, we let ΠA[·] be the projection operator on a closed
convex set A, i.e., ΠA[x] = argminy∈A ‖x− y‖.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section we provide our problem formulation for
energy management in smart grid. On the supply side, there
is a utility company which interacts with a set of prosumers
by selling electricity. On the demand side, there are many
prosumers who interact with each other as well as with
the utility company through a non-cooperative stochastic
game. In Subsection II-A, we first describe the interaction
game among prosumers, and postpone the formulation for
the utility company until Subsection II-B.
A. Stochastic Game Among Prosumers
We consider a set N := {1, 2, . . . , N} of N prosumers,
each of which can both produce and consume energy. Each
prosumer i ∈ N has a storage unit of maximum capacity
Smaxi , whose energy level at time step t = 1, 2, . . . is
modeled by a random variable Si(t) (note that {Si(t)}∞t=1 is
a random process). We assume that each storage is subject to
self-discharge1 which is a common phenomenon in batteries
and reduces the stored charge without any connection. More-
over, each prosumer is equipped with a renewable energy
generator, such as a wind turbine or a solar panel. We denote
the effective generated energy, or simply generated energy,
which is the energy harvested from renewable resources
minus the storage self-discharge of prosumer i at time t
by random variable Gi(t). Since the amount of generated
energy depends on many random factors such as climate
conditions, therefore, in general Gi(t) is a random variable
which admits both negative or positive values (negative when
the battery self-discharge is more than the harvested energy,
and positive, otherwise).
We denote the amount of energy consumed by prosumer
i between times t and t + 1 by Li(t). Moreover, we
assume that each prosumer can compensate its shortage of
energy by buying additional energy (if needed) from the
utility company. We denote the extra energy demanded by
prosumer i from the utility company at time t by Di(t).
Here, consumption refers to any type of energy usage by a
prosumer such as energy used for lighting or heating, while
demand is the amount of additional energy requested by a
prosumer from the utility company in order to satisfy its
needs. Consequently, the storage level of prosumer i in the
next time step, Si(t+ 1), will be:
Si(t+ 1)=min
{
[Si(t)+Gi(t)+Di(t)−Li(t)]+, Smaxi
}
.
(1)
Due to the fact that, in reality, the amount of traded
energy, stored energy, or price are measured based on discrete
quantities (e.g. 1kWh, $1) even though the nature of these pa-
rameters is continuous, we let the range of generated energy,
consumed energy, demanded energy, and stored energy of
prosumer i be discrete sets Gi := Z, Li := {0, 1, . . . , Lmaxi },
Di := {0, 1, . . . , Dmaxi }, and Si := {0, 1, . . . , Smaxi }, re-
spectively. In fact, the storage level of each prosumer can be
1Self-discharge is due to internal chemical reactions, just as closed-circuit
discharge is, and tends to occur more quickly at higher temperatures [29].
considered as its state at time t which evolves according to
a stochastic process governing the randomness of generated
energy from renewable resources. Thus, depending on how
much energy is left in the storage until from time t, Si(t),
and the amount of generated energy at that time Gi(t),
prosumer i must take an action Ai(t) := (Li(t), Di(t)), so
as to determine how much energy to consume and how many
additional energy units to demand from the utility company,
in which case its actual instantaneous payoff will be
Ui(Ai(t),A−i(t)) = fi(Ai(t))−Di(t)× pi(D(t)), (2)
where fi(·) is an increasing function representing the satis-
faction of prosumer i from consuming Li(t) units of energy,
and pi(·) is the energy price function based on all prosumers’
demands which is charged to prosumer i for buying Di(t)
units of energy given other prosumers’ demandD−i(t). Note
that Di(t) can be a function of Li(t) and Si(t), where by (1)
the latter itself is a function of the random generated energy
Gi(t). Thus, the payoff of each player is implicitly a function
of generated energy and storage level of all prosumers.
Remark 1. Although Di(t) and Li(t) are assumed to belong
to independent sets Di and Li, however, they are constrained
by the state dynamics (1). Nevertheless, our analysis remain
unchanged even if Ai(t) belongs to a more general constraint
set, e.g., Ai(t) ∈ {(Li, Di) ∈ Li ×Di : Li +Di ≤ ∆}.
We now provide a formal definition on how the prosumers
can select their actions at different time instants [30]:
Definition 1. A policy Ψi for prosumer i is a sequence of
probability measures Ψi := {Ψi(t), t = 1, 2, . . .} over the
action set Ai such that at each time t chooses an action
from Ai := Li × Di according to the probability measure
Ψi(t) whose distribution in general can be a function of
past histories of states, actions, or even time. A policy Ψi is
called a stationary policy if the probability of choosing an
action ai ∈ Ai only depends on the current state si and is
independent of the time t. In the case of stationary policy,
we denote this time independent probability by Ψi(ai|si).
Next, assume that each prosumer i ∈ N chooses its
action at different time instants based on some policy Ψi.
Here, we note that due to the discrete nature of variables,
the instantaneous payoff received by prosumer i is a dis-
crete random variable whose randomness comes from two
different sources: i) The random generated energy from
renewable resources. Indeed, as seen from (1), the state
of prosumer i evolves as a function of random process
{Gi(t), t = 1, 2, . . .} and ii) The internal randomness of
joint policies Ψ = (Ψ1, . . . ,Ψn). This is due to the fact that
the prosumers choose their actions at different stages based
on some probability distribution which depends on the joint
policies. As a result, although each prosumer has knowledge
about its own policy and random generated energy, however,
it is quite uncertain about the randomness caused by the other
prosumers’ decisions and generated energy.
In this regard, there is strong evidence [20] that, in the
real-world, human decision makers do not make decisions
based on expected values of outcomes evaluated by actual
probabilities, but rather based on their perception on the
potential value of losses and gains associated with an out-
come. Indeed, using prospect theory (PT), the authors in
[20] showed that most people will often overestimate low
probability outcomes and underestimate high probability out-
comes. This phenomenon, known as weighting effect in PT,
reflects the fact that humans usually have subjective views
on uncertain outcomes. For instance, for a given policy Ψi,
prosumer i’s payoff depends with some probability on others’
policies Ψ−i and renewable resources G−i. However, due
to the uncertainty that prosumer i has about its opponents’
policies and renewables, instead of using actual probabilities
induced by Ψ−i and G−i to evaluate its own expected
payoff and then take its action accordingly, prosumer i may
use a weighted version of those using a nonlinear function
wi(·), taking into account its own subjective view about its
opponents.2 Moreover, each prosumer may have different
perception about its loss or gain. This phenomenon that in
reality human sort their losses or gains with respect to a
reference point using their own, individual and subjective
value function is known as framing effect in PT. This differs
from conventional expected utility theory (EUT),3 which
assumes players are rational agents that are indifferent to the
reference point with respect to which their losses or gains
are evaluated. Hence, at each time instant t, each prosumer
receives a payoff which is the realization of a random vari-
able whose expectation equals its expected prospect payoff
and, then, this prosumer makes its next decision.
To capture such human decision behavior, we use the
following definition from PT [20]:
Definition 2. Any prosumer i has two corresponding func-
tions wi(·) : [0, 1] → R and vi(·) : R → R, known as
weighting and valuation functions. The expected prospect
of a random variable X with outcomes x1, x2, . . . , xk, and
corresponding probabilities p1, p2, . . . , pk, for prosumer i is
given by EPT [X] :=
∑k
`=1 wi(p`)vi(x`).
Although there are many weighting and valuation func-
tions, however, two of the widely used functions in the lit-
erature are known as Prelec weighting function and Tversky
valuation function defined by [31], [32],
w(p) = exp(−(− ln p)c),
v(x) =
{
xc1 if x ≥ 0,
−c2(−x)c3 if x < 0,
(3)
where 0 < c ≤ 1 is a constant denoting the distortion be-
tween subjective and objective probability, and c1, c2, c3 > 0
are constants denoting the degree of loss aversion. In fact, the
functions in (3) are suggested based on extensive real-world
experiments. However, our approach can accommodate any
type of such functions without making use of the specific
forms given in (3) as long as the weighting function wi(·) is
2For example, prosumers often perceive losses more than gains and intend
to overweight their losses and underweight their gains.
3In EUT the decisions are made purely based on conventional expectation.
a continuous function and wi(·) and vi(·) satisfy axioms of
valid weighting and valuation functions in PT [20] (we only
use the specific functions (3) in Section VI to provide more
concrete simulation results).
Therefore, based on Definition 2, we assume that each
prosumer i makes it decision at time t based on the real-
ization of a random variable whose expectation equals its
expected prospect payoff EPTΨ,G[Ui(A(t))], rather than its
actual expected payoff. Here, the expectation is with respect
to the internal randomness induced by joint policy of all
prosumers, Ψ, as well as their random generated energy
processes G. As the prosumers are individually maximizing
their own payoffs and since their actions are coupled, the
use of a game-theoretic solution [33] is apropos. Hence, we
can formally formulate a stochastic game among prosumers
as follows:
• A set of prosumers (players) N . Each prosumer i ∈ N
has an action set Ai, and a state set Si.
• Denoting the entire state of the game at time step
t by S(t) ∈ S1 × . . .×SN , each prosumer i takes
an action Ai(t) ∈ Ai with some probability based
on its own policy Ψi and receives a payoff which is
the realization of a random variable whose expectation
equals its expected prospect payoff EPTΨ,G[Ui(A(t)].
• Depending on what states and actions are realized at
time t, the state of the game will move to a subsequent
random state S(t + 1) whose distribution depends on
the probabilities that the players choose their actions
and those of being in different states at time t.
• Since the players choose their actions at different stages
of the game based on some policy profile Ψ :=
(Ψi,Ψ−i), the average expected payoff received by
prosumer i is given by
Vi(Ψi,Ψ−i) : = lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
E
PT
Ψ,G
[
Ui
(
A(t)
)]
, (4)
where the expectation is with respect to the randomness
induced by the joint policy Ψ, and state of the game. 4
In this game, each prosumer in the grid seeks to select a
policy which maximizes its own average perceived revenue
given by (4).
B. Optimization Problem for the Utility Company
Next, we incorporate the role of utility company into
our problem setting. Using (2), one can see that the utility
company interacts with prosumers in two different ways:
i) Setting the electricity prices and ii) Producing enough
energy and distributing it among prosumers to satisfy their
demands. Although one can consider the utility company
itself as an additional player interacting with prosumers,
however, due to the fact that, independent of the prosumers’
actual demands, the utility company is responsible to satisfy
their needs by generating and distributing enough energy
among them, we formulate the utility company’s problem
4If the limit does not exist, we can replace lim with lim sup. However,
as we will see, for stationary policies this limit always exists.
as a separate optimization problem. Since generating and
distributing energy can be very costly for the utility company,
hence for a fixed pricing rule p(·) := (p1(·), . . . , pn(·)), the
most important question is to devise the amount of energy
to produce and the way to distribute it in the grid. In other
words, the utility company’s goal is to learn the demand
functions of the prosumers, in which case it can generate and
allocate accurate energy units to each prosumer, and hence,
minimize its allocation cost.
More precisely, consider a utility company which can allo-
cate energy to K ∈ N different substations. Each substation
can distribute the received energy from the utility company
to a disjoint subset of prosumers in the grid. We distinguish
each substation by the set of prosumers that it serves and
denote them by B1,B2, . . . ,BK . In fact, substations are the
main link between the prosumers and the utility company
as illustrated in Figure 1. At the beginning of each time
t = 1, 2, . . ., the utility company decides on the amount of
energy to generate and how to distribute it among different
substations, denoted by e1(t), . . . , eK(t). The action set of
the utility company at any time t will be:
E=
{
e=
(
e1, . . . , eK
)
: ei ≥ 0,∀i,
K∑
i=1
ei≤Emax
}
, (5)
where Emax is the maximum energy generation capability
of the utility company.
At time t, each prosumer demands extra energy Di(t)
at the price pi(D(t)) from its closest substation. If such a
trading results in a shortage of energy at some substation
B`, the utility company incurs a cost proportional to the
extra energy that it has to produce in order to fully satisfy
the prosumers’ needs in that substation. In other words, the
utility company benefits from selling energy to the grid,
but suffers a cost due to its prediction error in energy
generating at time t captured by (
∑
j∈B` Dj(t) − e`(t))2.
Given an allocation profile e(t) ∈ E and some arbitrary but
fixed pre-selected energy pricing function p(·), we define the
instantaneous cost of the utility company at time t to be
C(D(t), e(t)) : = β
K∑
`=1
e`(t)−
N∑
i=1
Di(t)pi(D(t))
+ γ
K∑
`=1
( ∑
j∈B`
Dj(t)− e`(t)
)2
, (6)
where β and γ are constant denoting the actual unit price of
energy generation and regeneration (due to prediction error)
for the utility company. The first term in (6) is the generation
cost for the utility company based on its prediction, the
second term is its income due to selling electricity to the
market with determined price function p(·), and the last term
corresponds to the extra cost that the utility company incurs
due to its false prediction in energy allocation to different
substations.
As mentioned earlier, the utility company must generate
enough energy and distribute it among different substations
Fig. 1. Illustration of the smart grid with 2 substations and 6 prosumers.
in order to satisfy prosumers’ demands. If the utility com-
pany were aware of the sequence of energy demands by
prosumers a priori, then it could easily solve an open loop
optimization problem to find its fixed optimal allocation rule
in order to minimize its overall cost. However, one important
challenge here is that since the prosumers’ demands heavily
depend on the outcome of the stochastic game among them,
it is not clear how much energy will be requested by different
prosumers at different stages of the game. Therefore, one can
define the regret of the utility company to be the difference
between its minimum costs when the utility company is
aware of the demands a priori and when it is not. This
provides a reasonable measure on how well the utility
company can predict the demand market, and hence, respond
to it properly. Therefore, the utility company aims to learn
the optimal allocation rules in order to minimize its overall
regret given by
RT :=
T∑
t=1
C(D(t), e(t))−max
x∈E
T∑
t=1
C(D(t),x).
which is a measure frequently used in the computer sci-
ence literature for evaluating the performance of a learning
strategy with respect to an uncertain environment. Here, the
utility company’s goal is to select a strategy that minimizes
its regret. This means that it dynamically allocates energy
units without knowing the actual demands with a similar
cost as if it knows the entire demand market ahead of time
and wants to find a fixed optimal allocation.
III. STATIONARY NE AMONG PROSUMERS
Next, we analyze the interaction among the prosumers
formulated as a stochastic game in Section II-A. Often in
smart grid there are many prosumers who are simultaneously
maximizing their own payoffs. Therefore, a global optimal
solution which maximizes all prosumers’ payoffs may not
exist. One suitable concept to solve this game, is that of
a Nash equilibrium (NE) which, for the studied stochastic
game can be formally defined as follows:
Definition 3. A policy profile Ψ∗ = (Ψ∗1, . . . ,Ψ∗N ) is said to
constitute a closed-loop Nash equilibrium (NE) if for all i ∈
N , and any policy Ψi of a given player i with payoff function
Vi(·) given in (4), we have Vi(Ψ∗i ,Ψ∗−i) ≥ Vi(Ψi,Ψ∗−i).
In other words, a policy profile constitutes an NE of the
stochastic game among prosumers if no prosumer can unilat-
erally improve its payoff by changing its policy. Therefore,
at a given NE, each prosumer can only look at its own
energy storage level and then decide on how much energy to
consume and to purchase from the utility company in order
to maximize its own payoff. Next, we state the following
assumption which essentially requires that the generated
energy process of different prosumers be independent.
Assumption 1. We assume that the generated energy pro-
cesses of prosumers form i.i.d random processes such that
λi := min|k|≤Smaxi
P{Gi=k}>0,∀i, where Gi denotes the gen-
erated energy distribution of prosumer i such that Gi(t) ∼
Gi,∀t. Moreover, we assume that prosumers have limited
computational capabilities such that they cannot estimate
each others’ policies by only looking at their own payoffs.
To justify the above assumption, extensive statistical ex-
periments in weather forecasting have shown that wind speed
often matches the Weibull or Rayleigh distributions [34].
Note that Assumption 1 allows different kinds of random
generated energy Gi for different prosumers as long as
they have reasonably large support to ensure that λi > 0
(which is the case for Weibull or Rayleigh distribution).
Moreover, as discussed in [35], it is generally assumed that
the weather system with a time separation of every 3 to 4
days can be assumed to be independent. In particular, if
the prosumers are located in relatively far distances from
each other, then they are most likely subject to independent
environmental conditions, i.e., independent generated energy.
It is worth mentioning that the independencies of generated
energy processes of different prosumers can be relaxed to the
cases in which there is a correlation among them. However,
in that case we need a stronger assumption which guarantees
that for each prosumer i and for any stationary policy Ψi of
that prosumer, the induced Markov chain of player i over its
states admits a unique stationary distribution [23].
We now state the following Lemma which says that any
stationary policy followed by a prosumer induces a stationary
distribution over its set of states, and that the convergence
to such a stationary distribution is geometrically fast.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1, for any stationary policy
Ψi of prosumer i, there exists a unique probability vector
piΨi over the states Si such that
max
s∈Si
∣∣PΨi{Si(t) = s} − piΨi(s)∣∣ ≤ (1− λi)t,
where PΨi{·} denotes the probability measure induced over
the state space of prosumer i when following policy Ψi.
Proof. A proof can be found in Appendix I-A.
Next, in order to establish the existence of NE among pro-
sumers, our first step is to characterize the best-response set
of each prosumer with respect to others. For this purpose, we
use a similar technique as in [30] to characterize the optimal
policy of each prosumer with respect to others using a linear
program with occupation measures as its variables. Denote
an arbitrary but fixed stationary policy for all prosumers other
than i by Ψ−i. Following any policy θi (not necessarily sta-
tionary) by prosumer i induces a probability measure Pθi{·}
on the trajectories of its joint state-actions (Si(t), Ai(t)).
On the other hand, since the dynamics of state-actions of
each prosumer is totally determined by its own policy and
its own generated energy process which by Assumption 1 is
independent of others, the induced probabilities over the joint
action-space of different prosumers are independent. Thus
P(θi,Ψ−i){S(t) = s,A(t) = a}
=Pθi{Si(t)=si, Ai(t)=ai}
∏
j 6=i
PΨj{Sj(t)=sj , Aj(t)=aj}.
Using (4), the payoff of the ith prosumer can be written as
Vi(θi,Ψ−i) = lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
∑
(s,a)
Pθi{Si(t) = si, Ai(t) = ai}
× wi
(∏
j 6=i
PΨj{Sj(t) = sj , Aj(t) = aj}
)
vi
(
Ui(a)
)
,
(7)
where wi(·) and vi(·) are the weight and valuation functions
of a prosumer i as described in Definition 2. In (7) we have
assumed that a prosumer has a subjective evaluation only of
the other players’ probabilities. This is because usually each
prosumer i is aware of its own prospect due to the fact that
Pθi{Si(t) = si, Ai(t) = ai} is fully determined based on its
own policy which is known to prosumer i (and hence it does
not weight that probability), but it has uncertainty on others’
policies (consequently their outcome probabilities). Then,
lim
t→∞wi
(∏
j 6=i
PΨj{Sj(t) = sj , Aj(t) = aj}
)
,
= wi
(
lim
t→∞
∏
j 6=i
PΨj{Aj(t) = aj |Sj(t) = sj}P{Sj(t) = sj}
)
,
= wi
(
lim
t→∞
∏
j 6=i
Ψj(aj |sj)P{Sj(t) = sj}
)
,
= wi
(∏
j 6=i
Ψj(aj |sj)piΨj (sj)
)
, (8)
where the first equality follows from the continuity of wi(·),
the second equality holds because Ψj is a stationary policy
which does not depend on time, and the last equality is due
to Lemma 1. Substituting (8) into (7) we get
Vi(θi,Ψ−i) = lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
∑
(s,a)
Pθi{Si(t) = si, Ai(t) = ai}
× wi
(∏
j 6=i
Ψj(aj |sj)piΨj (sj)
)
vi
(
Ui(a)
)
,
= lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
∑
(si,ai)
[
Pθi{Si(t) = si, Ai(t) = ai}
×
∑
(s−i,a−i)
wi
(∏
j 6=i
Ψj(aj |sj)piΨj (sj)
)
vi
(
Ui(a)
)]
,
= lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
∑
(si,ai)
Pθi{Si(t) = si, Ai(t) = ai} ×Ki(si, ai).
(9)
Here, Ki(si, ai) :=
∑
(s−i,a−i)
wi
( ∏
j 6=i
Ψj(aj |sj)piΨj (sj)
)
vi
(
Ui(a)
)
.
As seen from (9), for fixed stationary policies Ψ−i of other
players, the optimal policy for player i can be obtained
by solving a Markov Decision Process (MDP) whose
objective function Vi(θi,Ψ−i) depends only on the
marginal distribution of the ith player policy θi induced
on its joint state-action pair (Si(t), Ai(t)). As has been
shown in [30, Theorem 4.1], for any such MDP, the set
of stationary policies is complete and dominant, meaning
that without any loss of generality prosumer i can obtain
its optimal policy among stationary policies. Therefore,
letting θi := Ψi be the optimal stationary policy of
prosumer i with respect to Ψ−i, one can easily see that
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
PΨi{Si(t) = si, Ai(t) = ai} exists, and equals
Ψi(ai|si)piΨi(si). Now similar as to [30], define the
occupation measures {ρ(si, ai),∀(si, ai) ∈ Si ×Ai} to be
ρ(si, ai) := lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
PΨi{Si(t) = si, Ai(t) = ai}.
(10)
An occupation measure corresponding to a policy can be
considered as a probability measure over the set of state-
action which determines the proportion of time that the
policy spends over each joint action-state. An important
property of such formulation is that the average payoff cor-
responding to that policy can be expressed as the expectation
of instantaneous payoffs with respect to occupation measure.
Now using [30, Theorem 4.2 and Eq. (4.3)], we can write
the policy optimization problem for prosumer i given the
stationary policy Ψ−i of its opponents as the solution to the
following linear program:
max
∑
(si,li)
ρi(si, ai)Ki(si, ai),
s.t.
∑
(si,ai)
ρi(si, ai)(I{x=si} −W ixaisi) = 0, ∀x ∈ Si,
ρi(si, ai) ≥ 0, (11)
where W (i)xaisi =P{Si(t + 1) =x|Si(t) = si, Ai(t) = ai} de-
notes the probability that the state of prosumer i will change
from si to x, by talking action ai. Note that this quantity is
totally determined once the distribution of generated energy
Gi is known. Denoting the optimal solution of the above
maximization problem by ρi := {ρi(si, ai),∀(si, ai) ∈
Si × Ai} (for notational simplicity), one can construct a
stationary policy Ψi for prosumer i as:
Ψi(ai|si) = ρi(si, ai)∑
aj∈Ai ρi(si, aj)
. (12)
As shown in [30, Theorem 4.1], such a stationary policy
induces the same occupation measure as ρi, which implies
that the prospect payoff of the prosumer i by following policy
Ψi is the same as the optimal solution of the linear program
(11), i.e., Ψi is an optimal stationary policy for prosumer i.
Using this characterization, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 1. There exists a stationary NE policy for the
stochastic game among prosumers with prospect payoffs (4).
Proof. See Appendix I-B.
The proof of Theorem 1 follows by reformulating the orig-
inal stochastic game among prosumers as a “virtual” game
in normal form using the LP characterization given in (11),
and showing that the virtual game admits a pure-strategy NE,
which in turn implies the existence of a stationary NE in the
original stochastic game. The virtual game is composed of
N players (one for each prosumer) such that the action set
of player i equals to the set of feasible occupation measures
for prosumer i in the original stochastic game given by
Mi :=
{
ρi ≥ 0 :
∑
(si,ai)
ρi(si, ai)(I{x=si}−W (i)xaisi)= 0, ∀x ∈ Si
}
.
(13)
In particular, an action for player i in the virtual game means
choosing an occupation measure for prosumer i. For more
details about the virtual game, we refer to Appendix I-B.
We note that, in general, using PT rather than EUT can
eliminate the possibility of existence of an NE (see e.g.,
[36]). However, one of the advantages of our stochastic
game formulation is its rich structure which allows us to
conclude the same existence results even under PT. Here, we
should mention that, while dealing with the analytical study
of games under PT is more challenging, this is not the main
reason why we incorporated the role of PT into our model. In
fact, PT captures real-world subjective behavior of humans
[20] with substantial implications in real life events, as we
will see under our model in Section VI.
Theorem 1 yields two key insights: 1) It guarantees
existence of simple policies for the prosumers such that
simultaneously satisfy all the prosumers. As a result, the
prosumers do not really need to use sophisticated time
dependent decision rules in order to maximize their payoffs
and simple stationary policies are good enough. 2) It shows
that there exists a way to stabilize the electricity market
where the prosumers have no further incentive to change
their energy consumption or energy demand policies. Con-
sequently, this facilitates the prediction of energy production
and distribution for the utility company which, in turn,
improves the availability of energy to prosumers, and hence
the reliability of the entire grid. Now, an important question
is to see whether the prosumers can jointly reach one of such
equilibrium points as studied next.
IV. LEARNING AN -NASH EQUILIBRIUM POLICY WITH
LIMITED INFORMATION
As discussed in Section III, despite the fact that prosumers
cannot observe the entire state of the game or each others’
actions, there still exists a stationary NE in the system. In
fact, this is one of the main reasons why such a stochastic
game is desirable for energy trading in smart grids. This is
because, in reality, the prosumers do not really have access
to private information of others such as their stored energy or
consumption level. Even if such information were available,
to avoid extra computations or complete trust on the released
data, the prosumers may not want to use them as a baseline
in order to select their own policies. Moreover, once the
electricity market reaches a stable NE, all the prosumers can
benefit in a sense that everyone will be satisfied with its own
payoff given that others do not deviate. Therefore, an impor-
tant question one may ask is how can prosumers achieve one
of such NE policies with very limited information about each
other, i.e., by only observing their own instantaneous payoffs.
This mandates designing a suitable learning algorithm under
stochastic setting in which prosumers can infer necessary
information for steering their policies toward an NE by only
observing their own instantaneous payoffs. In this section, we
propose a distributed algorithm that enables the prosumers
to jointly achieve a policy profile with almost the same
performance as an NE, i.e., an -NE policy:
Definition 4. Given  > 0, a policy profile Ψ˜ is called an -
NE if no player can unilaterally improve its prospect payoff
by more than , i.e., Vi(Ψ˜i, Ψ˜−i) ≥ Vi(Ψi, Ψ˜−i)− .
Before we proceed further, we first state some of the
algorithm design challenges. The proposed algorithm must
operate under the least amount of information exchange. In
other words, following a policy, at each time t = 1, 2, . . .,
each prosumer can only observe its own instantaneous
prospect payoff at that time, but it has no information about
the payoffs received by the others, nor can it observe what
policies or actions are taken by others. In particular, a
prosumer does not know the structure of its own payoff
function and can only receive its value by taking one action
at each time t. To address this issue, we use some techniques
from multi-armed bandit problems [37].
The key idea in our algorithm is that instead of dealing
with an infinite horizon stochastic model for the original
stochastic game, we devise a learning algorithm for its virtual
counterpart. As previously discussed, one can reformulate the
stochastic game among prosumers as a normal form game
with occupation measures being players’ actions. Therefore,
our goal is to provide a scheme such that as long as it is
followed by prosumers, they repeatedly learn the equilibrium
occupation measures. Once such measures are learned, each
prosumer can reconstruct its own stationary policy at equi-
librium using the rule (12). Here, we note that although the
original stochastic game can be played for infinitly many
steps, but its equivalent virtual game can be played only
once. This is because the virtual game is not a repeated game
but a game which compresses all the information (such as
payoffs) of the infinite horizon stochastic game into only
one shot. Thus, we must extract the required information in
our algorithm without playing the virtual game repeatedly
and by only playing the original stochastic game. The key
observation here is that any time during which we need to
evaluate the payoffs received in the virtual game, we do
not need to play the original stochastic game until the end.
However, playing for a sufficiently long time will give us
enough information for the purpose of our algorithm design.
This will be formally stated in the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Given  > 0, there exists a time period T () such
that for any profile of stationary policies Ψ if the prosumers
follow Ψ for T () steps without changing policy, then
|Vi(Ψ)− V T ()i (Ψ)| < , ∀i = 1, . . . , N,
where V T ()i (Ψ) :=
1
T ()
∑T ()
t=1 E
PT
Ψ,G
[
Ui
(
A(t)
)]
denotes
the cumulative payoff of prosumer i up to T () steps.
Proof. See Appendix I-C.
Finally, unlike many multi-armed bandit problems with
finite action space, the considered virtual game contains a
continuum of actions Mi given by (13). In this regard, the
optimization problem of finding the best policy for each
prosumer can be formulated as a linear program over a
bounded polytope Mi. Since each linear program attains
its maximum value in at least one of its vertex (extreme)
points, to estimate the best response of each player in
the virtual game, we only need to estimate the payoffs
received by playing the vertex points ofMi. Note that since
each of polytopes Mi is defined using finitely many linear
constraints, the total set of vertex points are finite. In fact.
without any loss of generality we may assume that all the
action polytopes Mi, i = 1, . . . , N , have the same number
of vertex points r ∈ N, otherwise, we take r to be an upper
bound on the total number of vertices.
The proposed distributed learning algorithm is shown in
Algorithm 1. In this algorithm, each prosumer i holds a
sufficiently large T () (as in Lemma 2)5 and computes the
set of all the vertex points of its action set in the virtual
game denoted by Fi. This set can be fully determined by
prosumer i using its own internal Markov chain once the
distribution of Gi is known. After that, each prosumer par-
titions the entire horizon into “larger” intervals of the form
[(m− 1)(Nr + 1)T () + 1,m(Nr + 1)T ()),m = 1, 2, . . .,
each of which is partitioned into Nr+1 smaller sub-intervals
Z1, . . . , ZNr+1 of length T (). At the beginning of each
larger interval, each prosumer selects an occupation measure
ρi(m− 1) from Mi uniformly at random and constructs its
corresponding stationary policy Ψi(m− 1) using (12). After
that during the smaller sub-intervals each prosumer evaluates
the optimality of its sampled policy with respect to others
by playing its vertex policies within certain sub-intervals, as
has been illustrated for the case of 3 prosumers in Figure 2.
More specifically, the goodness of the selected sampled
policy Ψi(m−1) at the beginning of the mth larger interval
is examined over its smaller sub-intervals. For this purpose,
each prosumer switches its policy only at the beginning
of sub-intervals. Since each sub-interval is long enough,
sticking to a fixed policy in that sub-interval guarantees that
a prosumer can estimate its payoff for that fixed policy up
to a small additive error (Lemma 2). Moreover, prosumer
i plays the randomly selected policy Ψi(m − 1) in all
the sub-intervals, except r of them, namely, sampling sub-
intervals, in which it plays policies {Ψi1 , ...,Ψir}. Note that
5Even if T () is not known a priori, the prosumers can use a doubling
trick to find the right T () by doubling their period length every time that
Algorithm 1 does not terminate after a sufficiently long time, in which case
after at most log2(T ()) times restarting Algorithm 1, all prosumers will
find a valid period length T ().
Algorithm 1 Strategy for Prosumer i
Parameters Accuracy parameter , number of players n, period length
T ().
Initialize: Let Fi = {ρi1 , ..., ρir} be the vertex points of action setMi, and {Ψi1 , ...,Ψir} be the corresponding vertex (extreme) policies
obtained by (12). Choose an action ρi(0) uniformly at random and
independently from polytope Mi and compute Ψi(0) using (12).
for t = 1, 2, ... do.
If t ∈ [(m − 1)(Nr + 1)T () + 1,m(Nr + 1)T ()) for some
integer m ≥ 0, partition this interval into Nr + 1 sub-intervals
Z1, ..., ZNr+1, each of length T (). Follow policies Ψi1 , ...,Ψir in the
sub-intervals Z(i−1)r+1, . . . , Zir , respectively, and policy Ψi(m− 1)
in the remaining sub-intervals. Denote the policy of all other prosumers
in the jth sub-interval by Ψ−i(Zj). Let
• Vˆ (m)ik = V
T ()
i (Ψ−i(Z(i−1)r+k),Ψik )
• Vˆ (m)i = V
T ()
i (Ψ−i(ZNr+1),Ψi(m− 1))
If t = m(Nr + 1)T () for an integer m ≥ 1, then let
q
(m)
i =
1 if Vˆ
(m)
i > maxk=1,...,r
Vˆ
(m)
ik
− ,
0 otherwise;
If t = m(Nr + 1)T () and all players have played 1, then keep
playing Ψi(m−1) forever, otherwise, choose ρi(m) randomly according
to the uniform distribution over Mi.
end for
each prosumer i can find its vertex policies Ψi1 , . . . ,Ψir
using Mi which is fully known to it at the beginning of
Algorithm 1 and do not change. Since the sampling intervals
of different prosumers do not overlap (see, Figure 2), this
allows each prosumer to get an estimate within an small error
of its best response policy. Comparing the estimated payoffs
received by following Ψi(m − 1) with those of following
{Ψi1 , ...,Ψir}, prosumer i can decide whether it is playing its
best policy or not (up to a small additive term ). Finally, at
the end of each long period, i.e., t = m(Nr+1)T ()), if all
the prosumers are happy with their payoffs, i.e. q(m)i = 1,∀i,
this means that an -NE is obtained and the prosumers do
not need to change their policies. Otherwise, they randomly
choose new policies to explore more.
Here, q(m)i can be viewed as a signaling bit which is
a binary variable controlled by prosumer i whose value is
updated at the end of each longer interval m = 1, 2, . . .. The
value of this bit is always set to zero by player i except
when Vˆ (m)i > max
k=1,...,r
Vˆ
(m)
ik
− , which means that prosumer
i’s payoff by following policy Ψi(m − 1) during the mth
longer interval is at least as good as that for all of its vertex
policies minus . The signaling bit q(m)i can be thought
of as a satisfaction voting survey conducted periodically
among prosumers by the utility company in order to stabilize
the market faster. At the end of each longer interval m =
1, 2, . . ., each prosumer i sends its signaling bit to the utility
company (q(m)i = 0 means that prosumer i is not satisfied
with its current policy Ψi(m−1), while q(m)i = 1 means that
it is satisfied). Then, the utility company responds back to
all the prosumers by sending them a bit q(m) =
∏N
i=1 q
(m)
i .
If q(m) = 1, meaning that all players’ signaling bits are
equal to 1 in the mth period, then players stop searching
and stick to their current policies Ψ(m − 1). Otherwise,
players will continue exploring other policies by sampling
Fig. 2. Illustration of sampling intervals in Algorithm 1 for the case of
three prosumers (N = 3) in the larger interval t ∈ [(m−1)(3r+1)T ()+
1,m(3r + 1)T ()). Based on this structure, prosumer 1 can compute
Vˆ
(m)
11
, . . . , Vˆ
(m)
1r
using the policies in the first r columns. Similarly,
prosumers 2 and 3 can compute Vˆ (m)21 , . . . , Vˆ
(m)
2r
, and Vˆ (m)31 , . . . , Vˆ
(m)
3r
within the columns r+1, . . . , 2r, and 2r+1, . . . , 3r, respectively. Finally,
each prosumer i ∈ [3] can compute Vˆ (m)i within the last column 3r + 1.
from their occupation measure sets in the next period. The
convergence of Algorithm 1 can be shown formally in the
following theorem:
Theorem 2. If all the prosumers choose their policies based
on Algorithm 1, then almost surely they will converge to an
-NE policy which will be played forever.
Proof. See Appendix I-D.
Finally, we should mention that one of the advantages of
our proposed approach here was to introduce a distributed
learning algorithm that converges to an -NE policy under
PT, although finding closed form solutions for NE policies
under PT seems to be more complicated than under EUT
due to the extra nonlinearities in the problem.
V. NO REGRET ALGORITHM FOR THE UTILITY
COMPANY
Here, we investigate the optimization problem of the
utility company and provide an algorithm for the utility
company whose average regret goes to zero as the number
of interaction stages increases. Therefore, in the remainder
of this section our goal is to provide an adaptive online
algorithm which guarantees the average regret of the utility
company approaches zero as its number of interactions with
the prosumers becomes large. In other words, we show that
the utility company can follow a strategy whose average cost
is the same as its best fixed strategy if the entire sequence
of demands were known. To this end, we consider energy
allocation algorithm shown in Algorithm 2 for the utility
company which generates and assigns e`(t) units of energy
at time instant t to the `th substation.
Although there could be different strategies that the utility
company can follow in order to minimize its overall regret,
the following theorem asserts that Algorithm 2 provides one
such strategies. It is worth noting that in Algorithm 2 the
utility company first decides on its energy allocation rule
at time t using (14) without actually knowing the demands
of prosumers at that time. However, it turns out that the
updating rule (14) is sufficient enough to minimize the
average regret after sufficiently large number of iterations.
As another important feature of Algorithm 2 one can see
that it is computationally very cheap and tractable, as it only
requires projection of a point on a convex set at each time
instant which can be done quite efficiently.
Algorithm 2 Utility Company’s Allocation Algorithm
Upon receiving demands {D(1), . . . ,D(t− 1)} from the prosumers, and
allocating energy units {e(1), . . . , e(t− 1)} up to time instant t− 1, the
utility company generates and assigns e`(t) units of energy at time instant
t to the `th substation given by
e(t) =
∏
E
[
e(t−1)− 1√
t− 1∇eC
(
D(t−1), e(t−1))], (14)
where ΠE [·] denotes the projection operator on the set E given by (5), and
∇eC(·) denotes the gradient of function C(·) with respect to variable e.
Theorem 3. The average regret of the utility company
by following Algorithm 2 goes to zero as the number of
interaction stages increases. In particular, the regret of the
utility company after T interactions with the prosumers is
bounded above by O(
√
T ).
Proof. See Appendix I-E.
As a result of Theorem 3, the utility company can eventu-
ally learn its optimal allocation rule in hindsight independent
of the outcomes of the game playing among prosumers.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate our theortical results using
extensive simulations. To provide more concrete results,
throughout this section we consider some specific forms for
the demand and price functions. We let Di(t) := [τi +
Li(t)−Si(t)]+, where τi ∈ [0, Smaxi ] is an internal threshold
constant which is only known to prosumer i. Note that using
this demand function, the action for each prosumer i reduces
to only selecting its consumption level. The idea for such a
choice of demand function is that we assume each prosumer
has a certain threshold τi (e.g., amount of energy that a pro-
sumer usually anticipates to consume in a normal day) such
that it buys as much energy from the utility company which,
together with the current stored energy Si(t), satisfies its
current consumption Li(t), and saves an extra τi energy units
in the storage for the next time step. Moreover, we adopt the
fairness pricing function for the utility company (see, e.g.,
[6], [38]) which charges each prosumer proportional to its
demand over the aggregate demand of all others and is given
by pi(D(t)) := α
Di(t)∑N
j=1Dj(t)
, where α is a constant which
is set by the utility company.
A. Deviation from Expected Utility
First, we will analyze how PT can affect the optimal
strategic choices of the prosumers compared with EUT.
We consider N = 10 prosumers with independent Gaus-
sian generated energy distribution with mean and variance
vectors µ = (0.5, 0.5, 1, 0, 1, 0.7, 0.4, 0.8, 0.3, 1) and σ2 =
(2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 2), respectively. Moreover, we let the
internal thresholds of the prosumers be given by a vector
τ = (1, 0, 1, 2, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 2). We assume that the storage
of each prosumer has four different energy levels in kWh
such that Si = {0, 1, 2, 3}, and the consumption level of
each prosumer has three different levels Li = {0, 1, 2};
0 kWh for no consumption, 1 kWh for medium consumption,
and 2 kWh for high consumption. We set the unit price
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Fig. 3. Optimal policy for prosumer 5 given that all other prosumers
follow uniform policies. The top figure depicts this policy when prosumer
5 maximizes its average expected payoff, while figures 3-(b) and 3-(c)
illustrate its optimal policies under subjective evaluation with two different
distortion parameters c = 0.8, c2 = 1 and c = 0.6, c2 = 3.
parameter set by the utility company to α = 1. Furthermore,
we assume that the satisfaction function of all prosumers is
an increasing concave function such that f(x) = log(1 +x).
First, we assume that all prosumers except prosumer 5 follow
a uniform stationary policy in which, independent of their
storage levels, they consume 0, 1, or 2 units of energy with
equal probabilities of 13 at each stage. We consider two
different scenarios. In the first one, we simply assume that
prosumer 5 makes its decisions based on EUT, while in the
second case we assume that it selects its policy using PT
with weight and value functions given by (3) with parameters
c ∈ {0.6, 0.8}, c1 = 0.5, c2 ∈ {1, 3}, and c3 = 0.3.
Figures 3 illustrates the optimal stationary policy of pro-
sumer 5 in each of the above scenarios. In this figure the
length of the bar in (s, l)th coordinate indicates the optimal
probability of consuming l units of energy by prosumer
5 when its stored energy level equals s. From Figure 3,
we can see that there is a considerable difference between
optimal policy of prosumer 5 under EUT (Figure 3-(a)) and
PT (Figure 3-(b), (c)). In particular, when the parameters in
the weight and value functions of PT changes toward more
deviation from EUT (i.e., from Figure 3-(b) to 3-(c)), the
difference between the optimal policy under EUT and PT
will be more substantial. For instance, when prosumer 5 has
higher distortion in its subjective payoff evaluation, it tends
to consume more energy within lower ranges of its energy
storage. On the other hand, it becomes more conservative for
higher energy storage ranges as it becomes more sensitive to
future uncertainties.6 As an implication, the utility company
must allocate more energy units to the substations whose
customers act more subjectively, especially when they are
experiencing low amount of energy storage.
Figure 4 illustrates the received payoffs by prosumers 1 to
4 in terms of the number of players under two cases of PT
6Note that the loss in high energy regimes is considerably more than that
in low regimes which will be perceived even much more by that prosumer
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Fig. 4. Received payoffs by prosumers 1 − 4 under two cases of EUT
(left) and PT (right). It is assumed that all prosumers follow uniform policy
and they join the grid one by one from prosumer 1 to prosumer 10.
and EUT. Here, it is assumed that all the players follow a
uniform policy, and that they join energy trading sequentially
starting from prosumer 1 up to prosumer 10. From Figure
4, we can see that, the prosumers’ payoffs under EUT
increasingly converge to certain values as more prosumers
join the grid. As an example, starting from −0.6, the first
prosumers’ payoff increasingly converges to about 0.05 as
more prosumers join the energy market. One possible reason
for such outcome could be the mean field phenomenon which
becomes more apparent as more prosumers join the grid.
This is because we have assumed that the random generated
process of prosumers are independent from each other, such
that for large number of prosumers their aggregate behavior
converge to certain distribution using central limits theorem.
Since a prosumer’s payoff strongly depends on the aggregate
decisions (e.g., the choice of pricing function), it is reason-
able to view a similar type of convergence in prosumers’
payoffs. However, this property no longer holds in the case
of PT such that prosumers’ payoffs follow different pattern
without converging to any specific value. This is because
in the case of PT, uncertainties will increase as they now
stem from both renewable energy and the behavior of the
prosumers. As a result, any new prosumer who joins the grid
will bring extra uncertainties to the existing ones which ties
the prosumers’ payoffs in a much more complicated manner.
B. Achieving an -NE Policy
Next, we illustrate the convergence of Algorithm 1 to an
-NE through a numerical example. Hereinafter, we consider
only 3 different prosumers, each having 3 storage levels such
that S = {0, 1, 2}, and two consumption levels L = {0, 1}
(each prosumer either decides to consumes energy or not).
All other parameters remain similar to Section VI-A but
restricted only to the first three coordinates. For instance,
the mean of normal generated energy distribution for these
three prosumers are given by 0.5, 0.5, and 1, respectively. We
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Fig. 5. Illustration of received payoffs by prosumers at the beginning of
each long interval in Algorithm 1. As it can be seen, after 27 iterations the
prosumers with prospect payoffs reach to an -NE and stick to their policies
thereafter. Note that under EUT the prosumers reach to an -NE even faster.
set the length of sub-intervals in Algorithm 1 in which the
prosumers do not switch their policies to T () = 30. Finally,
we evaluate the policy selection of prosumers under two
different scenarios with EUT and PT. The prospect functions
of all prosumers are chosen as in Section VI-A with c = 0.8.
Figure 5 illustrates the trajectories of prosumers’ payoffs
for different random selection of their policies during ex-
ecutions of Algorithm 1. Here, the top three curves show
the trajectory of prosumers under PT, while the bottom
three show that under the EUT. Figure 5 shows that, after
each prosumer switches its policy 27 times, the profile of
policies converge to an -NE, under PT with  = 0.01. Then,
prosumers will abide by their equilibrium policies and do
not change them anymore. Interestingly, one can see that the
order of received payoffs by prosumers in the equilibrium
under PT is different from that under the EUT. Here, we
mention two possible reasons for such a phenomenon: i) The
nonlinear relationship between the equilibrium points under
PT and EUT due to the weighting and framing effects, and ii)
The existence of multiple equilibrium points with different
order of payoffs in either EUT or PT. In particular, under the
above settings, one can see that the policies converge faster
in the EUT case, compared to PT.
Figure 6 illustrates the -NE policies which are achieved
at the end of Algorithm 1. Here, for larger values of storage,
the prosumers decide to consume energy more confidently,
while for smaller storage values depending on their internal
parameters they become more risk averse and randomize
their strategies between using and not using energy. An
interesting and somehow counter-intuitive behavior in the PT
case can be seen in the behavior of prosumer 2 in Figure 6.
This prosumer has internal parameter τ2 = 0, in which case
when its storage level is 1, the expected utility suggests that
this prosumer must consume 1 unit of energy to improve its
instantaneous payoff. However, Figure 6 shows that prosumer
2 does not consume energy when S = 1. This is because
consuming energy at the current stage will bring the storage
level of prosumer 2 close to zero with high probability, in
which case, very likely, this prosumer will suffer lack of
energy in the next time step. Since the prosumer tends to
overestimate its loss, it decides to postpone its energy usage
to the future when it has enough energy in its storage.
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Fig. 6. -NE policies for each of the prosumers with prospect payoffs at
the end of Algorithm 1.
C. Energy Allocation Without Regret
Finally, we illustrate the performance of the utility al-
location Algorithm 2 for the same set of parameters as in
Section VI-B. Here, we consider three substations (one for
each prosumer). Here, we have set the cost of unit energy
production and reproduction for the utility company in (6)
to β = 1 and γ = 3, respectively. As it can be seen in
Figure 7, as the number of interactions between the utility
company and the prosumers increases, the utility company is
able to reduce its average regret by properly allocating energy
units to the prosumers. In particular, once the demand market
has been stabilized at an -NE, the utility company’s regret
approaches zero more smoothly because some uncertainty
due to prosumers’ policy switchings has been ceased. This
in turn makes the energy demand market more predictable
for the utility company.
Finally, Figure 8 represents the trajectories of online
energy allocation by the utility company to each of the three
prosumers which oscillate around their optimal offline energy
allocation when the demand market is known. Moreover, the
variance of fluctuations decreases as the number of interac-
tions increases, and when the market has been stabilized in
an -NE. In particular, one can see that the lowest and highest
amount and variance of allocated energy belong to prosumers
3 and 1, respectively (Figures 8-(c) and 8-(a), respectively).
This is due to the fact that prosumer 3 benefits more than
everyone by relying on its own renewable resources (with
higher expected energy generation µ3 = 1, and smaller
variance σ23 = 1). On the other hand, prosumer 1 has the least
reliable source of renewables (with the smallest mean and
highest variance), which in turn increases its energy demand
from the utility company with higher variance.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced a new model for energy
trading in smart grids using a stochastic game framework
in the demand side and an optimization problem for the
utility side. We have incorporated storage devices into our
formulation in order to improve energy management and
have captured uncertainty of renewable resources into our
grid design. Furthermore, we have formulated the prosumers’
payoffs using prospect theory in order to study the real-life
behavioral decisions of the prosumers. Then, we have shown
that such a stochastic game admits an NE among stationary
policies. In particular, we have developed a novel distributed
algorithm which guarantees almost sure convergence of the
prosumers’ policies to an -NE with very limited information
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Fig. 7. This figure shows the vanishing average regret of the utility company
as a result of its interactions with prosumers.
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Fig. 8. This figure shows the amounts of online energy distribution by the
utility company to each of the prosumers and their fluctuations around their
optimal offline in hindsight. One can see that prosumers with less reliable
renewables have higher and more unpredictable energy demands.
sharing among them. We have also provided an online algo-
rithm with vanishing average regret for the utility company
which learns the optimal energy allocation rules over time,
and have justified our results through extensive simulations.
As a future direction of research, one can consider a
generalization of the stochastic game among prosumers in
which there is a strong correlation among prosumers’ gener-
ating energy resources. Also, in our optimization problem for
the utility company, we have used regret as a performance
measure where the utility company’s goal is to compete
with its best fixed energy allocation in hindsight. This
performance measure is specially suitable in our setting since
the prosumers will eventually converge to their stationary NE
policies (hence in the long term what really matters for the
utility company is to learn its fixed optimal allocation in the
equilibrium). However, an interesting question here is to see
whether there is an online allocation strategy for the utility
company which achieves the same average cost as its best
dynamic allocation strategy in hindsight.
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APPENDIX I
A. Proof of Lemma 1
For any two states s′, s ∈ {0, 1, , . . . , Smaxi }, and a :=
(l, d) ∈ {0, . . . , Lmaxi } × {0, . . . , Dmaxi }, let W (i)s′as denote
the probability that the state of prosumer i will change from
Si(t) = s to Si(t + 1) = s′, by taking action Ai(t) =
a. We note that 0 < s + d − l ≤ Smaxi . This is because
s + d − l is the amount of energy units which is left in
the storage at the beginning of period [t, t + 1) which is
when prosumer i takes its action.7 Since the storage capacity
ranges from 0 to Smaxi , we have 0 ≤ s + d − l ≤ Smaxi ,
and in particular, |s′ − s − d + l| ≤ Smaxi . Moreover, since
the event {Gi = s′ − s − d + l} is a subset of the event{
min{[Gi + s+ d− l]+, Smaxi } = s′
}
, we can write
W
(i)
s′as = P{Si(t+ 1) = s′|Si(t) = s,Ai(t) = a}
= P
{
min
{
[Gi + s+ d− l]+, Smaxi
}
= s′
}
≥ P{Gi = s′ − s− d+ l}
≥ min
|k|≤Smaxi
P{Gi = k} = λi > 0,
where the last inequality is due to Assumption 1. Now
given a stationary policy Ψi followed by prosumer i, and
any two states s, s′ ∈ Si, the probability that the state of
prosumer i is at Si(t+ 1) = s′, given that it was at Si(t) =
s before, is given by QΨis′,s :=
∑
a∈Ai Ψi(a|s)W
(i)
s′as ≥∑
a∈Ai Ψi(a|s)λi = λi, where we note that Ψi(a|s) is
independent of time due to the fact that Ψi is a stationary
policy. Let QΨi be a Smaxi × Smaxi transition probability
matrix with entries equal to QΨis′,s. Then the probability of
being at different states at time t starting from some initial
state is given by a time homogeneous Markov chain with
transition matrix QΨi . Since the entries of QΨi are bounded
below by λi > 0, using the fundamental theorem of Markov
chains there exists a unique stationary distribution piΨi such
that ‖(QΨi)t−1(piΨi)′‖2 ≤ (1−λi)t. This implies the result.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Consider a virtual N -player game in normal form where
player i’s action set equals to the set of feasible occupation
measures for prosumer i in the original stochastic game:
Mi :=
{
ρi ≥ 0 :
∑
(si,ai)
ρi(si, ai)(I{x=si}−W ixaisi)= 0, ∀x ∈ Si
}
.
In particular, an action for player i in the virtual games means
choosing an occupation measure for prosumer i. Moreover,
for any joint action profile (ρ1, . . . , ρN ) chosen by players
in the virtual game, we define the payoff for player i by
Ji(ρi,ρ−i) := Vi(Ψi,Ψ−i) =
∑
(si,ai)
ρi(si, ai)Ki(si, ai),
where Ψi, i = 1, . . . , n is given by (10). Here we note that
policies Ψi, i = 1, . . . , n are well-defined except possibly on
the states where the denominator becomes zero. However, in
the definition of (12), if the denominator becomes zero, it
means that at some state si we have ρi(si, a) = 0,∀a ∈ Ai.
This in view of the definition of occupation measure (10) im-
plies that any policy which induces such occupation measure
does not put any probability mass on the state si. Hence,
at state si one can define Ψi(·|si) to be any probability
distribution over the action set Ai, without actually changing
the payoffs received by the prosumers. As a result, any two
policy which are defined using the same occupation measure
by (10) will result in the same payoff for prosumer i, i.e., to
the same value Vi(Ψi,Ψ−i). Hence, Ji(ρi,ρ−i) is a well-
defined function.
7Note that the generated energy Gi(t) will be realized and available for
use only at the end of period [t, t+ 1) or at the beginning of time t+ 1.
Next, we note that if there exists a collection of N
occupation measures ρ∗i ∈Mi such that (ρ∗1, . . . , ρ∗N ) forms
a pure-strategy NE of the virtual game, then the corre-
sponding induced stationary policies given by Ψ∗i (ai|si) =
ρ∗i (si,ai)∑
aj∈Ai ρ
∗
i (si,aj)
will be a stationary NE policy for the orig-
inal stochastic game. To see this more clearly, let (ρ∗i ,ρ
∗
−i)
be a pure-strategy NE of the virtual game. This means that
Vi(Ψ
∗
i ,Ψ
∗
−i) = Ji(ρ
∗
i ,ρ
∗
−i) = max
ρi∈Mi
Ji(ρi,ρ
∗
−i)
= max
ρi∈Mi
∑
(si,ai)
ρi(si, ai)K
∗
i (si, ai) = max
θi
Vi(θi,Ψ
∗
−i),
where K∗i (si, ai) :=
∑
(s−i,a−i)
wi
(∏
j 6=i
Ψ∗j (aj |sj)piΨ
∗
j (sj)
)
vi
(
Ui(a)
)
,
θi is an arbitrary policy for prosumer i, and the last equality
holds because maxρi∈Mi
∑
(si,ai)
ρi(si, ai)Ki(si, ai) is
exactly the linear program (11) describing the optimal
policy (best response) of prosumer i for given choice of
stationary policies Ψ∗−i of other prosumers.
Therefore, we are only left to show that the virtual game
admits a pure-strategy NE. For this purpose, we benefit from
the following Lemma from [39]:
Lemma 3. [39, Theorem 1] Consider a concave game
in normal form where each player i, chooses an action
mi ∈ Mi, where Mi is a closed convex bounded set, and
obtains a payoff Ji(mi,m−i). Assume that Ji(mi,m−i) is
a concave function of mi for every arbitrary but fixed m−i,
and continuous function of m,∀m ∈M1×. . .×MN . Then
the game admits a pure-strategy NE.
To complete the proof, we show that the virtual game
is indeed a so called concave game which satisfies the
conditions of Lemma 3. Clearly the action sets Mi
are closed convex polyhedron which are determined by
a set of linear constraints. Moreover, for any arbitrary
but fixed ρ−i ∈ M−i, the payoff of player i is
given by Ji(ρi,ρ−i) =
∑
(si,ai)
ρ(si, ai)Ki(si, ai),
which is a linear function of ρi, and hence a
concave function of ρi. Moreover, using Lemma 5
and by continuity of wi(·), the term Ki(si, ai) =∑
(s−i,a−i) wi
(∏
j 6=i Ψj(aj |sj)piΨj (sj)
)
vi
(
Ui(a)
)
is a
continuous function of Ψ−i. Since Ψ−i itself is a continuous
function of ρ−i (recall that for all k, Ψk(ak|sk) =
ρk(sk,ak)∑
aj∈Ak ρk(sk,aj)
which is a continuous function of
ρk), therefore Ji(ρ) :=
∑
(si,ai)
ρ(si, ai)Ki(si, ai) is a
continuous function of ρ = (ρi,ρ−i). Appealing to the
result of Lemma 3 one can see that the virtual game admits
a pure-strategy NE. This completes the proof.
C. Proof of Lemma 2
First we note that for a joint stationary policy Ψ, we have
Vi(Ψ)=
∑
(s,a)
piΨi(si)Ψi(ai|si)wi
(∏
j 6=i
Ψj(aj |sj)piΨj (sj)
)
vi
(
Ui(a)
)
.
Since wi(·) is continuous over the compact interval [0, 1],
it is uniformly continuous. Thus for any  > 0, there
exists a positive constant δi such that if |x − y| < δi, then
|wi(x)−wi(y)| < . Let δ = min δi, 1 = min{, δN2 }, and
T = ln(1)ln(1−λ) , where λ = minλj . Using Lemma 1, if t > T ,
we have maxsj∈Sj
∣∣PΨj{Sj(t) = sj} − piΨj (sj)∣∣ < 1 for
all prosumers j. For simplicity of notation let us define
PΨjt (sj , aj) := PΨj{Sj(t) = sj , Aj(t) = aj}. We can write
|PΨjt (sj , aj)− piΨj (sj)Ψj(aj |sj)|
= Ψj(aj |sj)
∣∣PΨj{Sj(t) = sj} − piΨj (sj)∣∣
< Ψj(aj |sj)1, ∀j.
Using this relation, we can write∣∣∣∏
j 6=i
PΨjt (sj , aj)−
∏
j 6=i
piΨj (sj)Ψj(aj |sj)
∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∏
j 6=i
(
piΨj (sj)Ψj(aj |sj)+Ψj(aj |sj)1
)
−
∏
j 6=i
piΨj (sj)Ψj(aj |sj)
∣∣∣
=
∏
j 6=i
Ψj(aj |sj)
∣∣∣∏
j 6=i
(
piΨj (sj)+1
)
−
∏
j 6=i
piΨj (sj)
∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∏
j 6=i
(
piΨj (sj)+1
)
−
∏
j 6=i
piΨj (sj)
∣∣∣=1 d
dx
∏
j 6=i
(
piΨj (sj)+x
)
|x∈[0,1]
≤ (N − 1)1(1 + 1)N−2 < N × δ
N2
× (1 + δ
N2
)N < δ, (15)
where the second inequality is because Ψj(aj |sj) ∈
[0, 1],∀j, and the last equality is by mean value theorem.
Now let ∆1 be a uniform upper bound on the value function
of the instantaneous payoffs, i.e., ∆1 = maxi,a vi
(
Ui(a)
)
,
and ∆2 be a uniform upper bound on the weight functions,
i.e., ∆2 = maxi,x∈[0,1] wi(x). Denoting the set of all states
and actions by S and A, respectively, we have
|V T ()i (Ψ)− Vi(Ψ)| =
=
1
T ()
∣∣∣ ∑
(s,a)
T ()∑
t=1
[
PΨit (si, ai)wi(
∏
j 6=i
PΨjt (sj , aj))
− piΨi (si)Ψi(ai|si)wi
(∏
j 6=i
Ψj(aj |sj)piΨj (sj)
)]
vi
(
Ui(a)
)∣∣∣
≤ ∆1
T ()
∑
(s,a)
T∑
t=1
∆2+
∆1
T ()
∣∣∣∑
(s,a)
T ()∑
t=T
[
PΨit (si, ai)wi(
∏
j 6=i
PΨjt (sj , aj))
− piΨi (si)Ψi(ai|si)wi
(∏
j 6=i
Ψj(aj |sj)piΨj (sj)
)]∣∣∣
≤ ∆1
T ()
∑
(s,a)
T∑
t=1
∆2+
∆1
T ()
∑
(s,a)
T ()∑
t=T
∣∣∣PΨit (si, ai)−piΨi (si)Ψi(ai|si)∣∣∣∆2
+
∆1
T ()
∑
(s,a)
T ()∑
t=T
∣∣∣wi(∏
j 6=i
PΨjt (sj , aj))−wi
(∏
j 6=i
Ψj(aj |sj)piΨj (sj)
)∣∣∣
≤ T∆1∆2|S||A|
T ()
+
(T ()−T )∆1∆2|S||A|
T ()
+
(T ()−T )∆1|S||A|
T ()
,
where the first inequality is obtained by slitting the sum over
two intervals [1, T ] ∪ [T, T ()], and upper bounding each of
them in terms of ∆1 and ∆2. The second inequality hods by
rearranging the terms and using triangle inequality, and the
last inequality is valid by Lemma 1 and definitions of ∆1
and ∆2. Finally, by choosing T () ≥ 3T∆1∆2|S||A| (recall
that T =
ln(min{, δ
N2
})
ln(1−λ) ) the right hand side of the above
relation will be at most , which completes the proof.
D. Proof of Theorem 2
First we argue that if qmi = 1,∀i, then the policy which is
followed last by the prosumers, i.e., Ψ(m−1) must constitute
an -NE, which by the rule of the algorithm it must be played
forever. Let us consider an arbitrary but fixed i. When qmi =
1, this means that Vˆ (m)i > max
k=1,...,r
Vˆ
(m)
ik
− . Since in the
sub-intervals Z(i−1)r+1, . . . , Zir, only the ith prosumer is
sampling the policies corresponding to its vertex points, we
have Ψ−i(Z(i−1)r+k) = Ψ−i(m− 1). We can write
|Vˆ (m)ik − Vi(Ψ−i(m− 1),Ψik )|
= |V T ()i (Ψ−i(Z(i−1)r+k),Ψik )− Vi(Ψ−i(m− 1),Ψik )|
= |V T ()i (Ψ−i(m− 1),Ψik )− Vi(Ψ−i(m− 1),Ψik )| < ,
where the last inequality is due to Lemma 2. Similarly, in
the last sub-interval prosumers are following Ψ(m − 1).
Therefore, |Vˆ (m)i − Vi(Ψ(m− 1))| < . Now we have
Vi(Ψ(m− 1)) > Vˆ (m)i −  > max
k=1,...,r
Vˆ
(m)
ik
− 2
> max
k=1,...,r
Vi(Ψ−i(m− 1),Ψik )− 3
= max
Ψi
Vi(Ψ−i(m− 1),Ψi)− 3 (16)
where the last equality holds because the maximum payoff
of the ith prosumer is obtained by following a policy
corresponding to one of the extreme points of player i’s
actions in the virtual game. Since (16) holds for all i, this
implies that Ψ(m− 1) must be a 3-NE (or simply -NE by
rescaling  to 3 in all the above analysis).
On the other hand, if ρ(m− 1) is an -NE for the virtual
game, then Ψ(m − 1) is an -Nash policy for the original
game, in which case using similar argument as (16) one
can show that Vˆ (m)i > max
k=1,...,r
Vˆ
(m)
ik
− ,∀i, and hence
q
(m)
i = 1,∀i. In other words, once the random selection of
occupation measures at the beginning of some long interval
[(m − 1)(Nr + 1)T () + 1,m(Nr + 1)T ()) forms an -
NE, then the algorithm will stuck there and prosumers will
continue playing that -Nash policy forever.
Finally, we need to show that almost surely, there will be
a time such that qmi = 1,∀i. Using Theorem 1 we know that
the virtual game has at least one pure-strategy NE denoted
by ρ∗. Since Ji(ρ) is a continuous function of ρ ∈ M1 ×
. . . × MN , for any  > 0, there is a δ > 0 such that if
|ρi − ρ∗i | ≤ δ, ∀i, then |Ji(ρ) − Ji(ρ∗)| < , ∀i. In other
words, all the occupation measures profiles ρ satisfying |ρi−
ρ∗i | ≤ δ, ∀i, will form an -NE for the virtual game (and
hence, their corresponding policies are -Nash policy for the
original game). Since, at the beginning of each longer period
m = 1, 2, . . ., each player i chooses an occupation measure
ρi(m−1) fromMi, uniformly at random and independently
from others, thus the probability that the randomly selected
profile ρ(m−1) is an -NE is at least δN . Let M be a random
variable denoting the first integer m such that ρ(m − 1)
is an -NE. We have P{M ≥ m} < (1 − δN )m. Since∑∞
m=1 P{M ≥ m} <∞, Borel-Cantelli lemma implies that
almost surely M < ∞, i.e., the algorithm finds an -NE
policy and uses it forever.
E. Proof of Theorem 3
For any arbitrary but fixed demand profile D(t), one can
easily see that the cost of the utility company given by (6) is
a convex function of energy allocation profile e(t). This is
simply because for fixed D(t), C(D(t), e(t)) is a quadratic
function in terms of e(t). Moreover, the action set of utility
company E given by (5) is a closed convex set, and we have
max
x,y∈E
‖x− y‖ = Emax <∞. In addition, given fixed D(t),
the function C(D(t), e(t)) is differentiable with respect to
e(t), and we have ‖∇e(t)C(D(t), e(t))‖2 =
∑K
`=1
(
β −
2γ
∑
j∈B`Dj(t)+2γe`(t)
)2
≤ K(β+2γKDmax+2γEmax)2,
which shows that maxe(t)∈E ‖∇e(t)C(D(t), e(t))‖ is uni-
formly bounded above for all t.
Next, we state the following lemma from online convex
optimization whose proof can be found in [40, Theorem 1]:
Lemma 4. Let C be a closed convex set. For t = 1, 2, . . .,
consider a sequence of decision points xt∈C, and a sequence
of convex functions ht(·) :C → R, such that xt = ΠC [xt−1−
γt−1∇ht−1(xt−1)]. If F := max
x,y∈C
‖x − y‖ < ∞, and H :=
max
x∈C,t=1,2,...
‖∇ht(x)‖ <∞, then by choosing γt := 1√t , we
have
∑T
t=1 ht(xt)−minx∈C
∑T
t=1 ht(x) ≤ ( 12F 2 +H2)
√
T .
To finish the proof, one can imagine that at each time step
t, the utility company takes an action in the closed convex set
E , and the prosumers collaboratively with nature choose the
demand D(t), which in turn determines a convex function
ht(x) := C(D(t), x). Now if the utility company selects its
allocation energy e(t) to different substations based on (14),
then appealing to Lemma 4 one can see that the average
regret RTT of the utility company is bounded by O(
1√
T
).
F. Continuity of Stationary Distribution
Lemma 5. Let piΨi denote the unique stationary distribution
corresponding to the Markov chain with transition prob-
abilities QΨis′,s :=
∑
a∈Ai Ψi(a|s)W
(i)
s′as where W
(i)
s′as are
constant numbers and Ψi is a stationary policy. Then piΨi
is a continuous function of Ψi.
Proof. Since the transition weights QΨis′,s are linear functions
of Ψi, the transition matrix QΨi = (QΨis′,s)s′,s is a continuous
function of Ψi. Now assume {Ψi(k)}∞k=1 be a sequence of
stationary policies converging to Ψi, and denote the unique
stationary policies of QΨi(k) by piΨi(k). Since {piΨi(k)}∞k=1
is a sequence in the product of compact probability sim-
plexes, it has an accumulation point pi∗ with a sub-sequence
converging to it. With some abuse of notation let us denote
this sub-sequence again by {piΨi(k)}∞k=1. We have
pi∗ = lim
k→∞
piΨi(k) = lim
k→∞
QΨi(k)piΨi(k) = QΨipi∗.
This means that pi∗ is also a stationary distribution for QΨi .
Since we have assumed that QΨi has a unique stationary
distribution piΨi , this implies that piΨi = pi∗. Thus piΨi is the
only accumulation point of piΨi(k), which shows that piΨi is
a continuous function of Ψi.
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